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Glossary 
Sucre 
MCCH 
Maquita 
FOB 
CUi 
Fair-trade 
FLO 
Fine or Flavour 
The Ecuadorian national currency (soon to be replaced by the 
US dollar) 
Maquita Cusbunchic Commercializando corno Hermanos. 
Ecuadorian church based development organisation. 
Agroexportadora Maquita. The trading arm of MCCH that 
exports cocoa. 
Free on Board. Describes a commodity that has been loaded 
onto a ship at the port of origin. 
Cost, Insurance and Freight. Describes a commodity that has 
arrived in the port of destination. 
A certified trading system that aims to provide fair 
remuneration to small commodity producers, preferential pre-
finance and a stable trading environment. 
Fairtrade Labelling Organisation. 
A type of cocoa that finds favour especially among Swiss 
chocolate manufacturers. 
3 
Summary 
Introduction 
DFID's Forest Research Programme is funding a three-year project to research the 
role that ethical trade can play in improving the lives of forest dependent people in 
developing countries. The project asks fundamental questions about whether such 
trade can deliver appropriate benefits, how effectively current ethical initiatives 
operate, and what practical steps can be taken to improve performance. 
The research summarised in this report forms one of three comparative studies that 
will address the questions ofhow current ethical trade practitioners operate in the 
forest products context and whether the trade brings incremental benefits to forest 
dependent people. It examines ethical trade of cocoa in the context of 
Agroexportadora Maquita (shortened in this report to "Maquita"), an alternative trade 
organisation operating in Ecuador. Evidence was gathered on the type of financial 
improvements that Maquita brings to smallholder cocoa growers, the size of these 
benefits, and how the organisation manages to deliver them. The research also 
analyses the international part of the ethical cocoa trading chain and draws 
conclusions on the appropriateness of the commodity for ethical trade. The basis for 
the study is a comparison with the conventional cocoa trade. Although fair-trade is 
discussed, this report does not present a detailed evaluation of fair-trade cocoa 
systems. Rather it focusses on Maquita's ethical trading strategies, of which fair-trade 
plays a minor role. 
A separate study conducted by a social development expert examines the social 
impact that ethical and conventional trading has had on cocoa growers in Ecuador. 
Key findings 
• The Ecuadorian economy is currently a difficult environment in which to conduct 
business. 
• The Ecuadorian cocoa marketing system does not restrict competition. 
• Against this background, Maquita's business performance has been impressive. 
The company has out-performed most of its conventional trade competitors. Its 
success is the result of high calibre management. 
• Maquita's cocoa operations are subsidised to a small extent. Donor grants have 
provided the organisation with capital to invest both in its marketing operations 
and in improving bean quality at the farm level. However, such financial 
assistance has only recently been available and played no part in the company's 
establishment. 
• Maquita trades on a preferential basis with approximately 15% ofthe smallholder 
farmers in the two provinces where it concentrates its activities. 
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• Maquita runs a transparent marketing system that reduces transaction costs for 
both growers and traders. 
• Under its preferential buying programme, Maquita pays a price premium of 
between 8 and 15% over the standard buying price. 
• Maquita has provided training in cocoa cultivation, post-harvest issues and farm 
management to its target smallholder growers. The impact that this recently 
implemented programme has had on grower incomes has yet to be measured. 
• Fair-trade cocoa helped Maquita to establish itself. Since 1996, Maquita has sold 
only a very small part of its cocoa through fair-trade channels. 
• Although European companies that have become involved in fair-trade make 
profits from their fair-trade activities, they could probably make more money if 
they concentrated their resources on conventional trade. 
• Motivations among these European companies are varied. Good-will and the 
capacity to serve a niche market seem to play the greatest roles. 
Conclusions 
• Maquita's impressive commercial performance has allowed it to deliver 
substantial financial benefits to its target smallholder cocoa producers. This has 
only been possible because Maquita's management has excellent commercial 
skills. 
• Maquita's managers combine ethical awareness with business acumen. 
• A sustainable future for international fair-trade cocoa will only be secured if the 
market grows. The most likely source of growth is through supermarkets. 
Increased scale will improve profitability for the existing participants and will 
attract new companies to engage in the trade. 
• The lack of scale also limits the impact that fair-trade cocoa can have on grower's 
m comes. 
• Cocoa is an appropriate commodity for ethical trade. It has been traded for many 
years, is consumed in large quantities, and has all the necessary infrastructure to 
support its trade. Furthermore, it is processed into luxury items that have few 
substitutes and have a high profile in consumer's minds. 
• However, with the current low level of fair-trade cocoa sales and in the absence of 
a recovery in international cocoa prices, one of the few paths to widespread 
increases in producer incomes is to improve marketing skills and efficiency within 
countries of origin. Maquita has achieved this in Ecuador. 
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Part 1. The Ecuadorian Ethical and Conventional Trading Chains 
1.1 Introduction to the Ecuadorian economy 
Ecuador is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. In 1998, its GDP per capita 
was US$1,614, significantly lower than neighbouring Peru's and Colombia's figures 
ofUS$2,536 and US$2,522 respectively. 
Ecuador's foreign debt in 1998 was 82% ofits GDP, one ofthe highest levels in the 
region. Rather disturbingly, the country's ability to service this debt has been 
consistently handicapped by large balance of trade deficits (US$1.36 billion in 1998). 
The economy is experiencing one of its worst recessions for many years. In the first 
quarter of 1999, GDP was 3.2% lower than in the same period of 1998. Despite the 
recession, the annual rate of inflation in the first half of 1999 was a high 53%, driven 
in part by the devaluation of the Sucre, which had lost more than half its value against 
the US dollar in previous 12 months. The nominal interest rate in 1999 was 
approximately 60%, giving a real interest rate (nominal rate minus of the rate of 
inflation) of 7%. By developing country standards, this real rate of borrowing is not 
high. 
Until the Sucre exchange rate was recently fixed in preparation for dollarisation of the 
economy, Ecuadorian exporters' Sucre earnings were rising more quickly through 
devaluation than the Sucre was losing its purchasing power through inflation 1• With 
much to lose, cocoa exporters have been among the most vociferous critics of the 
government's dollarisation policy. Most of these companies will have to become 
considerably more efficient if they are to survive the transition to the dollar economy. 
In early 1999, a liquidity crisis in the banking sector meant that simple monetary 
transactions became extremely difficult and time consuming. The situation became so 
severe that the government ordered most bank accounts to be frozen. Some of these 
funds remain inaccessible to account holders. 
The Ecuadorian economy is currently not an easy environment in which to conduct 
business. Civil unrest and subsequent political instability in recent months have only 
worsened the situation. 
1.2 Introduction to the cocoa sector 
Between 1965 and 1998 agriculture's contribution to national GDP fell from 25% to 
12% (see Table 1). At 0.6% ofGDP, cocoa's importance to national income is not 
large but its position as an export is rather more significant, accounting for between 3 
and 5% oftotal export earnings. 
1 However, for commodity exporters, the widespread fall in international prices will have partially 
offset this advantage. 
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Table 1. Agriculture's position in the economy 
SECTORS Millions Market · Growth 
US$ Sbare 
1998 % 98/97 
Aericulture 2,355 12.0% -1.86% 
Oil 1,119 5.7% -36.06% 
Manufacturing 4,371 22.3% 3.15% 
Electricity 57 0.3% 5.80% 
Construction 976 5.0% 5.98% 
Commerce 3,966 20.2% 0.89% 
Transport 1,906 9.7% 3.14% 
Financial Services 1,095 5.6% 0.76% 
Government Services, Social 2,558 13.1% 3.30% 
Services and Public Services 
Other elements of the GDP 1,197 6.1% 4.91% 
GDP 19,599 100.0% -1.23% 
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador 
Ecuador's 60,000 cocoa farmers devote approximately 300,000 hectares to cocoa 
cultivation. 54% of cocoa farms are smallholdings ofless than 10 hectares, while a 
further 33% are between 11 and 50 hectares in size. Large well-managed plantations 
constitute the remainder. Ofthe smallest farms, many have poor access to markets. 
Ecuador produces two types of cocoa, CCN51 and National Cocoa. The latter is the 
variety on which Ecuador has built its reputation as an origin of "fine or flavour" 
cocoa. National Cocoa trees are low yielding and are mostly restricted to small and 
medium sized farms. CCN51 by contrast is a high yielding hybrid and is mostly 
produced on large-scale plantations. Its closest substitutes are the bulk cocoas from 
West Africa but it has yet to find a significant export market due to problems with 
high acidity. Ecuador's local cocoa processing and chocolate manufacturing 
industries prefer CCN51 because it has high cocoa butter fat content and suffers no 
mould problems, a result of the careful post-harvest practices that are followed on 
commercial plantations. 
Most cocoa exporters are adamant that the dominance of National Cocoa should not 
be threatened by CCN51 . They are concerned that Ecuador should not lose its "fine 
or flavour" reputation, but more importantly, they worry that they will lose the 
generally positive price differentials2 for the higher grades of National Cocoa. 
Exporters' profitability relies heavily on these differentials. In response, the exporters 
have formed ANECACAO, an association that safeguards the integrity ofNational 
Cocoa exports and certifies quality. The association also sets a daily reference price 
that is used to calculate the fees that exporters pay for export certification. It is 
calculated on the basis of the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) 
prices minus exporters ' costs and margins. 
2 Premiums that buyers are willing to pay over standard commodity exchange prices. 
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Ecuadorian cocoa is marketed without government interference. Local prices are 
driven by international prices and by local supply and demand. Demand from 
Ecuador's cocoa processing industry and from neighbouring countries occasionally 
causes local prices to move out-of-sympathy with New York and London prices. 
In contrast to its pre-eminent position early this century, Ecuador is now a minor 
cocoa exporter. Cote d'Ivoire, the world's leading producer with exports of more 
than a million tonnes of cocoa a year, dwarfs Ecuador's exports by a factor of more 
than ten. 
1.3 Competition, efficiency and transparency within the cocoa sector 
Ecuador's cocoa bean export marketing system does not restrict competition. 
Monopolies and cartels are absent, government interference is minimal, levels of 
horizontal and vertical integration are low, and no barriers to entry exist. 
A useful indicator of marketing efficiency is the proportion of the export cocoa price 
that is paid to producers. As a rough guide, a high ratio indicates low marketing 
costs. Ecuadorians involved in the cocoa industry often quote proportions as high as 
80 to 85%. Unfortunately, these figures are somewhat misleading. The export price 
used in the calculation refers to the CSCE price with no adjustments made for average 
price differentials, while the "producer price" is in fact not the price that most 
producers receive but the price that exporters pay at their yards. Most producers are 
located far away from exporters' yards and are unable to sell directly to exporters. 
Transport costs and intermediaries' margins bite significantly into ex-yard prices, 
leaving producers with a much smaller share of the export price. The more candid 
informants that we interviewed estimated that smallholder producers receive between 
40 and 50% of the CSCE price. (Our estimate for 1999 puts the proportion at no more 
than 57%). Equivalent figures from West Africa suggest that Ecuador's cocoa bean 
marketing system is more efficient than the systems in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, 
although probably not as much as is commonly perceived. For instance, Ghana's 
producers receive approximately 40% of the FOB price that the country's Cocoa 
Board receives. 
Information relevant to the cocoa sector is readily available through newspapers, and 
radio and television broadcasts. It extends beyond just prices to cover items on 
production techniques and market conditions. However, as with almost any 
marketing system in developing countries, the wealthy marketing chain participants 
have the greatest access to high quality information. This information asymmetry 
disadvantages smallholder producers in price negotiations with traders. In the more 
remote areas, growers with limited quantities of produce to sell have even less 
bargaining power because of the scarcity ofbuyers. 
Transaction transparency also suffers as a result of the sharp practices that many 
cocoa traders employ. Scales often understate the true weight of cocoa sacks, and 
discounts for high moisture and extraneous matter are often higher than they should 
be. 
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1.4 The conventional marketing chain 
All cocoa exported from Ecuador is handled by at least some of the following types of 
marketing chain participant: 
• Cocoa growers 
• Village assemblers (often the local shopkeeper) 
• Area assemblers 
• Itinerant traders 
• Urban wholesalers 
• Exporters 
Large cocoa growers are usually able to by-pass intermediaries and sell directly to 
exporters. However, this study is concerned with disadvantaged smallholder cocoa 
growers, whose cocoa is subject to the full marketing chain. The large number of 
intermediaries reflects the need to assemble cocoa beans in rural areas. The type of 
smallholder production relevant to this study is very small scale and exists in 
scattered, remote locations. Cocoa must therefore be assembled in sufficiently large 
quantities before urban buyers are willing to bear the costs of coming to collect it. 
The village assembler conducts the first level of assembly. Such people are often the 
owners oflocal shops and therefore have more capital than most villagers. Village 
assemblers are usually constrained to buying the small quantities of cocoa offered by 
most local growers. At purchase, the beans are usually fermented but not dried. 
Consequently, once the assembler has graded, weighed and purchased the cocoa, he 
must spend time drying it. The accuracy of the scales and methods of grading used to 
calculate the purchase price are often alleged to be biased against the grower, who 
often has little choice other than to sell within the village. Assemblers often extend 
credit in cash or kind to villagers. 
Once the village assembler has gathered tradable volumes of cocoa, he has several 
options depending on his remoteness from major trading centres. He can sell to an 
itinerant trader, transport the beans to an area assembler, or if he is near enough to a 
major town, he can sell directly to an urban wholesaler. 
Area assemblers perform the same functions as a village assembler but operate on a 
larger scale and across a larger area. Itinerant traders offer a link between rural and 
urban areas. They operate on a high capital turnover basis by avoiding cash advances 
to assemblers, and by moving the product (usually using their own transport) as 
quickly as possible to urban wholesalers or exporters. 
Urban wholesalers operate on a large scale and are usually well established in the 
business. Their role is to assemble large quantities of well-dried cocoa and to store it 
until they can sell it in bulk to cocoa exporters. As a way of ensuring a sufficient flow 
of product into their warehouses, wholesalers often provide cash advances to rural 
assemblers with whom they have built up a history of trust. 
95% of cocoa bean exports leave from Guayaquil, Ecuador's major industrial area and 
port. Remaining exports are handled at the port in Manta. Once exporters have made 
an assessment of quality of the cocoa offered by wholesalers, exporters purchase, sort 
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the beans into export grades, bag in sisal sacks and fumigate for insect pests. If the 
exporter sells through a broker, he relinquishes the responsibility for shipping. If 
selling directly to an overseas buyer, the exporter must make port handling and 
shipping arrangements. The company must also contact ANECACAO which is 
responsible for checking and certifying the quality of cocoa bean exports. 
1.5 Ethical trade - Agroexportadora Maquita 
In contrast to the conventional chain, several alternative trading organisations operate 
on a more vertically integrated basis. The largest and most successful is 
Agroexportadora Maquita (shortened to Maquita in this report), a component of one 
of Ecuador's largest church based development organisation, Maquita Cushunchic 
Commercializando como Hermanos (MCCH). Maquita started exporting cocoa in 
1992. The following table shows the rapid increase in its export volumes. 
Table 2. Maquita 's Growth. 
Year Total US$ Total Tonnes Tonnes 
Earnin2s Sold E:xported 
1992 20,700 68 12 
1993 43,500 159 24 
1994 95,160 591 60 
1995 170,700 523 132 
1996 1,150,606 926 879 
1997 1,826,399 1263 1227 
1998 1,457,478 863 846 
1999 5,827,446 4915 4866 
Source: MCCH 
Maquita's rise has been so quick that by the end of 1999 it was ranked in the top five 
Ecuadorian cocoa exporters. 
1.6 The Maquita marketing chain 
Maquita concentrates its operations in two of Ecuador's largest cocoa producing 
provinces, Esmeraldas and Manabi. They account for approximately 85% and 10% of 
Maquita's purchases respectively. Maquita has focussed on Esmeraldas partly 
through an accident ofhistory (the founder ofMCCH first worked in Esmeraldas) but 
also because it is one of the most under-developed provinces. Manabi, adjoining 
Esmeraldas on the coast to the south, became part ofMaquita's cocoa buying area 
when the need to expand became apparent. 
Maquita operates a vertically integrated marketing system which, it claims, rewards 
the loyalty of affiliated smallholder co-operatives. It also purchases from 
conventional traders on non-preferential terms in order to realise economies of export 
scale. 
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Apart from the control that Maquita extends along the entire length of the marketing 
chain, there are few operational differences that distinguish the conventional and 
Maquita systems. While each locality in which Maquita buys requires slightly 
different arrangements, the basic operation is set out below: 
Maquita's community agents (assemblers) purchase on preferential terms only from 
smallholder growers who belong to affiliated grower associations. The criteria for 
becoming affiliated are that the association should operate in remote areas, should be 
well organised and its members should possess smallholdings of less than 
approximately 7 hectares. 
Either Maquita or one of its partner organisations provides the agents with working 
capital to initiate local purchases. The agents are then responsible for assessing the 
level of extraneous matter among the unfermented wet beans, for weighing and for 
paying a preferential price (minus any deductions for excessive extraneous matter) to 
the member smallholders. Weighing is done in the presence of the grower and on 
scales that are regularly checked for accuracy by Maquita or partner organisation 
staff. Once the purchase has been made, the agent ferments, dries, sorts and bags the 
beans. Maquita expects their agents to make a reasonable profit, although poorly 
performing agents are liable to make a loss. 
Maquita operates yards in the cities of Esmeraldas and Guayaquil. Depending on the 
region where purchases are made, the responsibility for transporting the beans to the 
yards falls either on Maquita or on its rural agents. How Maquita is able to afford to 
pay preferential prices is examined in section 1.1 0. 
Maquita also buys at market prices from third parties who are not part of its 
preferential purchasing programme. In 1999, it purchased approximately 55% of its 
cocoa in this way. Before the effects ofEl-Nino were fully felt in 1998, only 40% of 
purchases were on a non-preferential basis, an indication that the most disadvantaged 
cocoa farmers (for instance, those within Maquita's preferential purchasing 
programme) were affected most severely by the disaster. The proportion of 
preferential purchases is reportedly recovering. 
On receiving the cocoa, the yards are responsible for grading, assessing moisture 
content, weighing, calculating and paying the purchase price, drying beans to a 
storable moisture level, bagging and storage. The purchase is designed to be as 
transparent as possible in order to allay suspicions of cheating. For purchases of less 
than 500lbs, Maquita uses a published table against which visual grading can be 
performed consistently. For larger purchases, Maquita uses an electronic moisture 
meter. Discounts for excessive moisture levels are applied on a sliding scale for both 
methods. Maquita is unusual among exporters in using such precise methods. 
All Maquita's cocoa sooner or later arrives at the Guayaquil yard. In the case of 
cocoa from Esmeraldas, the organisation contracts private hauliers. In Manabi, the 
farmer association is responsible for transporting cocoa to Guayaquil, and does so at 
its own risk and expense. 
Maquita's head office in Guayaquil is responsible for setting prices, which it does 
with reference to its FOB export earnings. Maquita' s prices are valid for a week and 
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information on them is readily available, thereby simplifying planning along the 
marketing chain. 
Figure I. The conventional trading chain compared with Maquita's preferential 
trading programme. 
Conventional Chain 
Smallholder 
Cocoa Grower 
.,, 
Assembler 
-
~ 
Itinerant Trader 
~ 
Wholesaler 
~ 
~· 
Exporter 
Maquita's Preferential Chain 
Smallholder Cocoa Grower 
(member of Maquita affiliated grower 
association) 
• 
Assembler 
(community 
agent) 
• 
.. 
Affiliated 
Association 
.. 
Maquita 
Figure 1 indicates how streamlined Maquita's preferential trading chain is in 
comparison with the conventional chain. Although exactly the same roles are 
performed in both chains, Maquita and its partners have internalised activities to their 
operations. Consequently, the number of times the cocoa changes ownership has been 
reduced. Fewer transaction, at least in theory, should mean lower costs. 
1.7 Maquita's Smallholder Coverage 
According to its own figures, Maquita trades on a preferential basis with 1017 
smallholder growers. This figure represents approximately 3% of Ecuador's total 
number of smallholder cocoa growers (those with less than 10 hectares ofland). 
However, Maquita's smallholder coverage is more appropriately judged on its 
performance in Esmeraldas and Manabi, where its operations are concentrated. We 
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estimate that Maquita's preferential purchasing programme deals with 15% of the 
smallholder growers in these two provinces. 
1.8 Costs, revenues and profits along the Maquita trading chain 
Table 3 indicates how value is added along Maquita's preferential purchasing 
marketing chain, and forms a "snap-shot" oftrading in June 1999 (using field data 
collected during that time). A more detailed summary of costs and assumptions 
appears in appendix 2. 
- ----- --
---- ~ --- - --- - - - - . -
US$/tonne of 
cocoa 
Producer 
Revenue 800 
Costs 314 
Gross profit 486 
Community assembler 
Revenue 880 
Costs 840 
Gross profit 40 
Maquita* 
Revenue 1128 
Costs 1021 
Gross profit 107 
Notes: 
Revenue figures assume that beans are sold at 7% moisture throughout the chain 
* An unweighted average of ASS and ASE bean qualities has been for used calculating costs and 
revenues. 
While the producer's profit is high compared with costs, the low volume of 
smallholder output means that net earnings are low. 
From figures in Table 3, producer revenue is approximately 70% ofMaquita's 
revenue. In other words, producers received about 70% of the export price in June 
1999. This compares favourably with the conventional trading chain, which we 
estimate paid producers no more than 60% of the export price in the same period3. 
Costs and margins must therefore be lower in the Maquita chain than they are in the 
conventional chain. 
1.9 Maquita's trading strategies 
Maquita takes a low risk export strategy, thereby promoting long-term business 
sustainability. Many Ecuadorian cocoa exporters have gone bankrupt by speculating 
on long and short positions (speculating on price movements either holding or not 
holding stocks), and few exporters operating ten years ago are still in business. 
Maquita prefers to spread its risks by speculating with only 10 to 15% of its sales. 
3 Maquita probably earns higher export prices than any of its competitors (refer to section 1.11 ). 
Consequently the comparison is not direct. However, it is close enough to be meaningful. 
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The strategy allows Maquita to engage in speculation while not exposing itself to 
large price risks. 
Another cause of risk is exchange rate variability. From the beginning of 1999 until 
January 2000 when the Sucre exchange rate was fixed against the dollar, the value of 
the Sucre exchange rate both fluctuated considerably and suffered a downward trend. 
When buying in Sucres and selling at some future date in dollars, stable exchange 
rates assist business planning. Although a devaluing currency gives exporters greater 
local currency eanrings over time, exchange rate volatility greatly increases trading 
risks. Maquita's strategy was to plan on the basis of pessimistic exchange rates, 
thereby reaping rewards from favourable movements without incurring major risks. 
Another feature that distinguishes Maquita from many of its competitors is the 
liquidity that it maintains in its trading system. This allows prompt cash payments to 
agents and therefore to smallholder growers. Maquita contributes to a buffer fund that 
is held centrally within MCCH. This fund can be accessed by any ofMCCH's trading 
operations in case of financial difficulty. As far as we are aware, Maquita has never 
drawn upon this fund. 
Perhaps the most important ofMaquita's recent successes has been its ability to trade 
directly with chocolate manufacturers in Europe. Most Ecuadorian exporters prefer to 
sell to local brokers who represent large international cocoa trading houses such as 
E.D.& F. Man and Waiter Matter. This arrangement relieves exporters of the burdens 
of arranging shipment and managing price risk. For their part, European chocolate 
manufacturers are generally unwilling to trade directly with exporters because the 
potential costs of late or non-delivery are too high (manufacturers' stocks are usually 
small). Maquita however, has earned the trust of European manufacturers and 
therefore reaps the reward ofhigher export prices. 
1.10 Fair-trade 
By far the greatest part of Maquita' s exports are sold on conventional markets in the 
US and Europe. Fair-trade markets, while having had some significance in the early 
days ofMaquita's operations, are now of marginal importance. 
·- - -----------
lmportinf! client 1996 1997 1998 
E.D.& F. Man (USA) 67% 48% 18% 
E.D.& F. Man (UK) 3% 12% 
Daamhouwer & Co. (Hol) 25% 17% 43% 
OS3 (Switzerland) 3% 1% 
Waiter Matter (Switzerland) 4% 29% 8% 
Max Havelaar (Hol) 1% 2% 
Atlantic Cocoa eo. (USA) 19% 
Total l OOo/o 100% 100% 
Source: MCCH, internal documents supplied by J. A. Santos 
Ofthe international buyers listed in Table 4, only OS3 (now called Claro) and Max 
Havelaar are fair-trade buyers. Maquita has proven its ability to compete in the 
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conventional market place, and although fair-trade buyers provided useful revenue, 
credit, stability and contacts in the early days, Maquita has graduated beyond the need 
for such help. 
The premium from the fair-trade price (which in 1999 was approximately US$600 
above Maquita's average export price) is distributed evenly among the members of 
Maquita's affiliated smallholder associations. 
1.11 Maqui ta' s business performance 
Growth and profitability 
With the exception of 1998, when El Nino caused a dramatic decline in national 
cocoa production, Maquita' s growth has been impressive (refer to Table 2). Table 5 
clearly shows El Nino's effect on Maquita's profits. The first five months of 1999 
were considerably more profitable for Maquita than the whole of 1998. 
Table 5. Maquita 's Income Statements f or 1998 and Jan -May 1999 
Jan -Dec 1998 Jan-May 1999 
(US$) (US$) 
TOTAL SALES (A) 1,457,479 2,360,500 
DIRECT OPERATING EXPENSES (B) 1,262,812 1,890,486 
GROSS PROFIT (C =A- B) 194,667 470,139 
INDIRECT OPERATING EXPENSES (D) 161,509 232,325 
OPERATING MARGIN (E =C-D) 33,158 237,814 
OTHER INCOME 
Project Income 97,208 2,645 
Other Income 44,106 170,770 
OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Project expenses 14,633 7 
Other expenses 106,823 103,127 
NET OTHER INCOME (H) 19,859 70,282 
NET MARGIN BEFORE TAX (I = G- H) 53,016 308,096 
The item in Table 5 entitled "OTHER 1NCOME" merits closer examination. These 
non-operating funds come from overseas donors and are mainly earmarked for farmer 
training. However, in recent years a small proportion of this money has been 
available as working capital. Furthermore, in 1996 Maquita spent donor money 
purchasing productive assets. Of the US$ 210,000 that the organisation spent 
acquiring and equipping its drying yards in Esmeraldas, US$ 90,000 was a grant from 
USAID's PL480 (a food aid related funding programme). 
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One way of looking at this non-operating income is to ask, "what advantage have 
these funds given Maquita over its competitors?". Since at least some of the funds 
have been invested as fixed and working capital, Maquita must have gained some 
advantage because, unlike its competitors, Maquita bears no cost from using the 
money. 
Maquita claims that the advantage has been small. It argues that donor funds were not 
available during the early years of its development, when it proved its financial 
sustainability. Furthermore, as an unknown exporter, Maquita initially had to borrow 
internationally at relatively high rates of interest. 
Maquita perhaps overlooks another advantage that donor funds give the organisation. 
A significant portion of the funds are spent on training farmers to improve the quality 
of their cocoa. Given that exporter profitability is based on the ability to receive 
positive price differentials for higher quality cocoa beans, the money spent on 
improving quality must help Maquita's financial position. 
Ultimately however, the financial advantages that Maquita derives from donor funds 
should not be regarded as unfair providing it passes the benefits to the target 
smallholder growers. Its performance in delivering these benefits is assessed in 
section 1.12. 
As a company, Maquita receives no special treatment from the Ecuadorian 
government. For instance, it pays taxes in exactly same way as its competitors. 
Export earnings 
According to official figures from 1999, ofthe top ten Ecuadorian cocoa exporters, 
Maquita received an average export price of S$1, 156 per tonne of cocoa, while the 
rest could manage an average of only US$965 per tonne. Furthermore, Maquita 
reportedly earned US$155 per tonne more than its second placed rival. These figures 
should however be treated with a degree of caution. During our fieldwork, all key 
informants agreed that Maquita is an honest organisation that publicly declares 
accurate figures of its performance. Conversely, we received tacit acknowledgement 
that other exporters may understate their financial performance in order to pay less 
tax. 
Despite this, there are still good reasons to believe that Maquita receives more per 
tonne of cocoa than its competitors. Perhaps the most compelling reason is that most 
of our informants, including rival exporters, believe that Maquita does out-perform its 
competitors. They cite several reasons: 
• Maquita concentrates heavily on exporting higher quality beans. In 1999, of all 
Maquita's exports, 50% was Arriba Superior Epoca (ASE- the lowest National 
Cocoa grade), 45% was Arriba Superior Summer (ASS- a higher grade) and 5% 
was Arriba Superior Summer Selecto (ASSS -usually the highest grade exported 
from Ecuador). Although we have no comparative figures for the same period, 
the national averages in the three years 1996 to 1998 were 66% ASE, 19% ASS 
and 15% ASSS. 
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• As already noted, Maquita has developed a strategy of exporting directly to 
chocolate manufacturers in Europe, thereby earning higher export prices. Few of 
its competitors have followed this approach. 
• Maquita's manager, Jose-Antonio Santos, is able to read the market well. 
Furthermore he maintains excellent direct relations with his overseas buyers. 
Marketing efficiency 
An alternative trading organisation can only expect to provide substantial financial 
benefits to its target group if it is at least as efficient as its conventional competitors. 
Unfortunately, for reasons of confidentiality, Maquita's competitors were unwilling to 
give us access to information that would allow us to make a quantitative comparison 
ofMaquita's marketing costs. However, most of our informants agreed that Maquita 
has lower costs than any of its competitors. They gave several reasons: 
• Maquita employs a minimum of managers and no administrative staff. All 
administration is conducted by the management team. 
• Maquita' s facilities are appropriate for its scale of operation. In Guayaquil, the 
organisation rents unsophisticated premises. Furthermore, it uses drying, sorting 
and grading machinery that are of appropriate capacity. Cost inefficiencies from 
under-utilisation are therefore minor. 
• Maquita specialises in cocoa and operates throughout the year. By contrast, 
several of its competitors trade a number of different commodities and only export 
cocoa seasonally. 
Innovation 
It appears that where Maquita goes, others follow. For instance, Maquita's vertically 
integrated approach to buying cocoa is now being adopted by other exporters. 
Likewise, ANECACAO has recently implemented a cocoa grower training scheme 
but only after Maquita had started its own scheme one year previously. Finally, with 
the advent of dollarisation, there is considerable pressure upon exporters to become 
more efficient and to export directly to overseas buyers, rather than trade through 
brokers. From its beginnings, Maquita strove for efficiency, and over the last two 
years, it has achieved direct exports. 
Perhaps conventional exporters do not follow Maquita's lead directly, but merely 
respond to similar pressures. However, Maquita is clearly better than most at reading 
and reacting to market and economic developments. 
Management 
Maquita's good business and innovatory performance is rather an anomaly. 
Efficiency and innovation are usually associated with competition among profit 
seeking companies. Maquita is part ofMCCH, a not-for-profit organisation. The part 
ofMaquita's profits that is not re-invested in the company goes directly to MCCH, 
where the money is used to fund farmer training and other socially motivated 
activities. 
Maquita provides an example of where good business and good ethics appear to 
complement each other. However, we believe that none ofMaquita's success would 
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have been possible without the sort of experience and skill that its manager, Jose-
Antonio Santos, brings to the organisation. He is an unusual man of unusual talent, 
who is motivated as much by social responsibility as by personal gain. 
1.12 Maquita' s ethical performance 
Price 
For cocoa purchased through its preferential scheme, Maquita claims to pay 8 to 15% 
over the standard price paid by other exporters. The exact premium depends on the 
FOB prices that Maquita receives at the time of setting the preferential price. 
Table 6 presents average cocoa buying and export prices for 19984. Although the 
information came from Maquita, we have no reason to doubt its accuracy. A simple 
subtraction of the figures in columns one and two of the table reveals that Maquita's 
preferential buying price was on average US$217 higher than conventional exporters' 
buying price. In proportional terms, Maquita's average price was 12.3% higher. 
Furthermore, Maquita's efficient marketing chain ensures that its target smallholder 
growers receive the full benefit of this premium. 
Table 6. A 
. - · --o - c B d E p· . 1998 
Conventional Maquita's Average Maquita's Average Average New York 
Exporters' Average Buying Price Export Price Exchange Price 
Buying Price 
US$/tonne US$/tonne US$/tonne US$/tonne 
1,585 1,703 1,780 1,570 
Source: Maquita. 
Table 6 also indicates the very small margins on which Maquita operated in 1998. 
The average difference between its buying price and its export price was just 
US$77.85. This reflects the extraordinary market conditions that prevailed in 1998, 
when supply was very tight due to the effects ofEl-Nino. In order to fulfil export 
contracts, exporters were forced to bid highly for the limited local cocoa supplies. 
Another point to note from Table 6 is that the average New York Exchange price was 
marginally below the average price at which conventional exporters were purchasing. 
Clearly, any exporter that survived 1998 must have received a considerable 
differential over the Exchange price. 
Transparency 
Maquita maintains a high level of transparency in its operations by using accurate 
measuring equipment and publicly available grading tables. Publicising and 
guaranteeing weekly purchase prices also contributes to transparency. Such practices 
decrease the likelihood that growers and traders will be cheated, and the subsequent 
4 Official government statistics suggest that the average conventional exporter buying price for 1998 
was approximately US$250 less than the figure provided by Maquita. However, government statistics 
only present the "reference" or "minimum" price that should be paid by exporters. Actual buying 
prices are usually significantly higher. This was especially so in 1998, when supply was extremely 
tight due to the effects ofEl-Nino. 
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trust that this engenders almost certainly reduces transaction costs. For example, 
growers are likely to spend less time negotiating with Maquita's agents ifthey know 
that weighing scales are accurate and the methods for assessing quality are fair. 
Likewise, the agents are less likely to spend time questioning Maquita's prices and 
quality discounts because information on these is readily available before the sale. 
Anecdotal evidence gathered during fieldwork indicates that Maquita is more 
transparent than its competitors. 
Influence on other traders 
In Manabi and especially in Esmeraldas, traders have been forced to match Maquita's 
nominal buying prices in order to maintain a presence in the market. Unfortunately 
this may have been at the expense of transparency. Unable to compete genuinely with 
Maquita on price, traders are suspected of understating weights and overstating 
quality defects. So, although traders may quote competitive prices, such underhand 
practices may mean that their actual buying prices are substantially lower. This view 
was offered by Maquita. Unfortunately we were unable to investigate its veracity. 
Training 
MCCH provides training on the following activities: 
• Production techniques 
• Post harvest management 
• Farm management (accounting and planning) 
Training is delivered by a mobile "cocoa school" that travels to Maquita's affiliated 
grower associations. Since the end of 1998, when the training programme started, 
between 600 and 700 farmers have been trained. These individuals are expected to 
pass their new knowledge on to other farmers. 30% of the training costs are met by 
Maquita and the rest comes from donors. 
Maquita believes that training is more important than the direct financial benefits that 
it delivers to its affiliated smallholder growers. Higher productivity, higher quality 
and better planning will, it believes, have a greater impact on farmers' lives than 
preferential prices. Unfortunately, because the training programme is in its infancy, 
its impact has yet to be measured. 
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1.13 Comparative Summary 
Table 7. Business and Ethical Performance: A comparison ofMaquita 's preferential 
dinf! chain with the conventional tradinf! eh · 
Conventional Chain Maquita's Preferential Chain 
Smallholder • Receives standard market price • Receives a price that is 8 to 15% 
grower • Price received is no more than higher than the standard market 
60% of the export price price. 
• Is unlikely to receive training • Price received is about 70% of 
from traders the Maquita's export price 
• Receives training on how to 
maximise revenue and minimise 
production costs 
Assembler • Is often suspected of cheating • Maquita and its partners regulate 
growers and monitor assemblers to ensure 
• Often sells to itinerant traders that dealings with growers are fair 
and transparent. 
Itinerant Trader • Provides link between rural and • Maquita or its affiliated 
urban areas organisations arrange transport, 
• Buys and sells in quick thereby avoiding change of 
successton. ownership = one less transaction 
Wholesaler • Buys, bulks, stores and sells to • Maquita has integrated this 
exporters function into its operations, 
• Buying procedures are not always thereby negating two transactions. 
transparent • Buying is highly transparent 
Exporter • Often sells through a local broker • Maquita earns export prices that 
• Often deals in more than one are 10 to 15% higher than those of 
export commodity its competitors 
• Open to bankruptcy through • Maquita sells directly to overseas 
unwise speculation customers as well as selling 
through local brokers. 
• Maquita has lower costs than its 
competitors. 
• Maquita specialises in cocoa 
• Maquita minimises speculative 
risk in order to maintain business 
stability. 
• Maquita contributes to grower 
training from its profits. 
• Maquita is subsidised by donor 
funds to a small extent 
20 
Part 2. Fair-trade Cocoa and Chocolate 
Although over 99% ofMaquita's cocoa is traded on conventional markets and 
therefore loses its "ethical trade" dimension at the point of export, a small percentage 
continues an "ethical" existence through fair-trade marketing channels in Europe. 
This part of the report examines the cocoa and chocolate fair-trade system. 
2.1 Fair-trade cocoa and chocolate 
Fair-trade cocoa and chocolate are market developments that are largely restricted to 
Western Europe. In 1999, for the first time, imports of fair-trade cocoa to the region 
may have exceeded 1,000 metric tonnes. While this would represent an increase of 
over 50% on the 1998 figure, it would still only be 0.1% of total cocoa imports to 
Western Europe. This lack of scale, and the problems it creates, currently limits the 
impact that the cocoa fair-trade system can have. 
Although fair-trade cocoa and chocolate have been available for over two decades, it 
is only since the early nineties that fair-trade labelling has brought a degree of 
uniformity to sales across Europe. The existence of a fair-trade label on the wrapper 
of a chocolate bar guarantees that a proportion of the ingredients has been purchased 
according to ethical rules laid down by the labelling organisation5. The rules relate to 
"fair" terms and conditions of purchase, and the democratic responsibilities ofthe 
fair-trade farmer organisations (refer to Appendix 4 for details). Certification and 
regular checks ensure that the rules are followed. Farmer organisations that do not 
meet the criteria are not excluded from fair-trade, providing they can provide 
evidence that they are making progress towards criteria fulfihnent. 
The majority of fair-trade cocoa comes from Kuapa Kokoo, a sizeable farmer co-
operative in Ghana. Supplies from this source reflect the generally high quality of 
Ghanaian cocoa, and the reliability of service guaranteed by the Ghanaian Cocoa 
Board. Other fair-trade cocoa comes from Bolivia, Ecuador and Cameroon. 
Commercial fair-trade participants in Europe hold licenses to operate within the fair-
trade system and have individual contracts with the Fair-trade Labelling Organisation 
(FLO). The companies are restricted to purchasing only from registered producer 
organisations and to sell to other licensee companies further down the supply chain. 
Fair-trade distributors who use fair-trade labels are obliged to pay royalties to the 
labelling organisation, which uses the funds to maintain, monitor and promote fair-
trade systems. 
2.2 Major Commercial Fair-trade Cocoa Participants in Europe 
Daarnhouwer & Co. BV. This long established Dutch commodity trading company 
has been involved with fair-trade cocoa since 1991. It currently handles between 70 
and 80% of all fair-trade cocoa imported to Western Europe. Although now part of a 
multinational company, Daarnhouwer has maintained its flexible and compact 
5 The exact proportion varies between types of chocolate. Some manufacturers abide by a minimum 
of 51% fair-trade content (including other ingredients such as sugar). 
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structure, as well as its reputation for dealing in speciality cocoa, coffee, tree nuts and 
dried fruit. 
Dutch Cocoa BV. Unusual in the increasingly concentrated cocoa processing 
industry, this relatively small company has remained independent oflarge multi-
nationals. Its flexible processing facilities allow it to serve a particular market niche 
that requires limited production runs of specialised cocoa products. The company has 
been involved in fair-trade cocoa since 1991 and currently processes over 70% of fair-
trade cocoa in Europe. 
Chocolat Bernrain. In addition to its own-brand conventional and organic chocolate, 
this family owned Swiss company produces about two hundred tonnes of fair-trade 
chocolate annually. The company's involvement in fair-trade chocolate pre-dates the 
advent of fair-trade labelling. For many years, the company has manufactured the 
"Mascao" brand of fair-trade chocolate, made from cane sugar from the Philippines 
and cocoa and cocoa butter from Bolivia. Bernrain now offers another brand of fair-
trade chocolate made from cocoa beans of various origins. 
Weinrich & Co. GMBH. This German chocolate manufacturer produces fair-trade 
chocolate for several fair-trade distributors within Europe. 
2.3 Fair-trade cocoa roles and responsibilities 
This section examines who does what in the European fair-trade cocoa and chocolate 
system. 
Pre-financing (financing trade) 
Under their contracts with FLO, importers are obliged to extend 60% of the FOB 
value of fair-trade cocoa purchases as credit to the exporter. By conventional 
standards, this advance is generous especially because there is no requirement for the 
exporter to present a warehouse receipt to prove that he has possession of the 
contracted quantity of cocoa. The buyer is therefore exposed to considerable risk of 
default. However, in practice, the 60% prefinancing arrangement is infrequently 
taken up by exporters. Kuapa Kokoo, for instance, benefits from selling through the 
Ghanaian Cocoa Marketing Board and therefore requires no trade finance from 
foreign sources. Maquita, while it initially required pre-finance, is now sufficiently 
large that it can find its own sources of credit. Only MACEFCOOP, the Cameroonian 
fair-trade exporter, currently uses the credit facility. The unpredictability of the 
Cameroonian supply chain has occasionally forced MACEFCOOP to default on their 
loans. 
Freight, insurance, handling, insurance and warehousing 
These arrangements are the responsibility of the cocoa trading house. 
Hedging (using international futures markets to manage price risk) 
This activity is responsibility of the trading house. In practice however, hedging only 
occurs when the international price of cocoa is above the minimum fair-trade price. 
FLO cocoa criteria (refer to Appendix 4) state that fairtrade prices should move in 
sympathy with international exchange prices unless the latter go below US$1 ,600 a 
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tonne. This price plus the fair-trade premium ofUS$150 a tonne establishes the 
minimum fair-trade price. International cocoa prices have been below US$1,600 a 
tonne for several years and therefore hedging has been unnecessary. Daarnhouwer 
and the other fair-trade importers currently face no price risk because fair-trade prices 
can not decline in the period between purchase and sale of fair-trade cocoa. 
Inventory (stockholding) 
Holding inventory of fair-trade cocoa is a service that Daarnhouwer provides for its 
customers. It means that chocolate manufacturers are usually able to purchase the 
type of fair-trade cocoa when and in the quantities that they want it. Previously, 
Daarnhouwer had been operating on a back-to-back basis (only purchasing when an 
order had been taken), but the lengthy delays that this caused prompted a rethink. 
Daarnhouwer's stockholding involves the company in considerable expense in terms 
of warehouse charges, insurance and the cost of working capital. To cover these 
expenses, a small levy is charged to buyers on each tonne of cocoa. 
Fair-trade cocoa processing 
All processing of fair-trade cocoa into its products (liquor, butter and powder) is 
conducted by FLO registered specialist cocoa processing companies, among whom 
Dutch Cocoa dominates the market. By contrast with these specialists, fair-trade 
chocolate manufacturers do not possess the scale to process cocoa profitably. 
Pricing fair-trade cocoa products 
This task, which is the responsibility of cocoa processors, is more complicated than 
may be apparent. Cocoa is initially processed into cocoa liquor, some of which goes 
straight into chocolate manufacturing, while the rest is further processed into cocoa 
butter and powder. The butter is used primarily for adding texture to chocolate 
(although is also used in cosmetics and pharmaceuticals) while cocoa powder is used 
in the baking industry. Although cocoa liquor yields a ratio of butter to powder that 
is on average equal to the ratio of fair-trade demand for the two products, instances 
frequently occur when demand and supply are out of balance. Given that Dutch 
Cocoa does not hold inventory of fair-trade butter and powder, the price the company 
charges for fair-trade product has to reflect the price that the counterpart product 
receives on the conventional market. For instance, if Dutch Cocoa has an order for 
fair-trade cocoa butter, yet cannot find a fair-trade buyer for the powder, the price that 
is charged for the butter has to be weighted upwards in order that the company covers 
the cost of purchasing the relatively expensive fair-trade cocoa beans. This situation 
is made worse when the price of conventional cocoa, and hence the price of 
conventional cocoa powder, are as low as those currently prevailing in the 
conventional market. Dutch Cocoa often finds difficulty in explaining to customers 
why low conventional cocoa prices should drive fair-trade cocoa product prices 
upwards. 
Fair-trade chocolate manufacturing, distribution and retailing. 
Manufacturing and distribution are done under licence from the labelling organisation 
members ofFLO. Distributors pay a royalty to labelling organisations for the use of 
the registered trademarks. This money is used to monitor fair-trade cocoa and 
chocolate supply chain, and to promote awareness of fair-trade chocolate and cocoa. 
Retailing is done both through specialist fair-trade outlets (such as those run by 
Oxfam) and, to a lesser extent, through supermarkets. 
23 
Traceability 
All participants from fair-trade cocoa exporters to fair-trade chocolate ·distributors are 
contractually obliged to report purchases and sales to FLO. This degree of openness 
allows FLO and its member organisations to monitor the flow of fair-trade cocoa and 
chocolate, with the aim of ensuring traceability of cocoa to its fair-trade origin. 
Occasionally, buyers in Europe require fair-trade cocoa that can not be sourced from 
stocks. In order to avoid costly delays, the buyers are supplied with conventionally 
traded cocoa of the same quality and from the same origin, while an order ofthe same 
specification is placed with the relevant fair-trade exporter. When it arrives, the fair-
trade cocoa enters the conventional market, thereby ensuring that the fair-trade 
exporter benefits from the original buyer's order and that the fair-trade importer does 
not benefit from selling conventional cocoa as a fair-trade commodity. This activity 
is sanctioned and closely monitored by FLO. 
2.4 Maquita's fair-trade export performance 
Maquita has a good reputation as a fair-trade exporter. It never defaulted on pre-
finance provided by Daarnhouwer, and the quality of its service and product are 
generally high. When product quality has become an issue, usually through 
occasional incidences of mould, solutions have always been found through 
allowances (deductions from the agreed FOB price). 
Maquita's position among other fair-trade cocoa exporters from other origins is 
strong. As the only supplier of fair-trade fine or flavour cocoa, Maquita's cocoa is 
particularly favoured by Swiss fair-trade chocolate manufacturers, who tend to use 
50:50 fine or flavour to bulk cocoas in their recipes. However, fair-trade cocoa from 
Kuapa Kokoo is likely to remain the most popular cocoa because it is the cheapest 
(the positive price differential Ghanaian cocoa receives is generally lower than 
differentials for the other fair-trade origins), is of uniformly high quality and produces 
a higher yield of liquor. 
Apart from the Swiss, most other buyers in Europe are indifferent to the perceived 
superiority of fine or flavour cocoa, meaning that Maquita's share of the fair-trade 
cocoa market is always likely to be limited. However the fair-trade market has helped 
to give Maquita access to much larger conventional cocoa demand. The company has 
also been very successful at promoting itselfwithout the help of fair-trade partners in 
Europe. 
2.5 Incremental costs incurred by European fair-trade participants 
The peculiarities of the fair-trade cocoa and chocolate market in Europe mean that 
participants incur costs that they would not face on conventional markets. These can 
be summarised thus: 
• Reporting: Fair-trade rules require participants to regularly report transactions to 
FLO. Although this may initially involve significant management time, once the 
procedures are in place, the cost of the reporting is minimal. 
• The size of the fair-trade cocoa market: The small size of the market means that 
efficiencies in processing and manufacturing have yet to be realised. Modem 
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capital intensive production techniques benefit from high volume production runs 
because disruption to production lines is minimised. 
• Transaction costs: The small size of each fair-trade transaction means that a 
disproportionate amount of staff time is spent on purchasing and selling, leading 
to higher transaction costs. Additional features of the fair-trade system, such as 
the necessity for Dutch Cocoa to load fair-trade cocoa product prices in response 
to low conventional market prices (as described above), mean that much time has 
to be spent maintaining customer relations. Similarly, Chocolat Bernrain, which 
is restricted to cocoa from just one fair-trade source for its production of 
"Mascao" chocolate, regularly spends time explaining to customers why the 
chocolate is not always available and why, in the absence of the ability to blend 
cocoa liquors from different origins, the taste of the product changes slightly 
between production runs. 
2.6 Incremental benefits enjoyed by European fair-trade participants 
Just as they incur costs, companies involved in fair-trade cocoa and chocolate also 
receive benefits from participating in the trade: 
• Limited competition: Fair-trade cocoa trading and processing are dominated by 
Daarnhouwer and Dutch Cocoa respectively. However, while this situation may 
have the appearance ofbeing a monopolist's paradise, in reality, given the small 
size of the market, there is little room for competition. Daarnhouwer further 
justifies its position by pointing out the significant overhead investment it made in 
establishing the trade in Europe. 
• Trust: Some participants feel that the transparency of transactions and the good-
will among fair-trade participants, means that trading is both more pleasant and 
less likely to lead to costly disputes. 
• Risk reduction: While conventional prices are below the minimum fair-trade 
price (leading to constant fair-trade cocoa prices), the price risk borne by 
Daarnhouwer and other trading houses is minimal. Good will may play a part in 
reducing risk by decreasing the chances of poor contractual performance. 
2. 7 Margins and profitability 
No attempt was made during the research on European fair-trade participants to ask 
for financial information. There are two reasons why this was the case. Firstly, given 
the dominance of certain companies in parts of the trading chain, any presentation of 
financial data in this report would reveal confidential information on company 
performance. Secondly, nearly all the companies involved in cocoa and chocolate 
fair-trade also operate in conventional markets, thereby making the task of 
distinguishing between fair-trade and conventional trade profitability using 
aggregated company accounts highly arbitrary. 
However, even without financial information, several useful observations on margins 
and profitability can be made. Companies involved in fair-trade are free to set their 
own margins, and generally claim that margins are approximately equivalent or 
slightly less than those earned through conventional trading or production. 
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A peculiarity of margin setting is revealed in the case of Dutch Cocoa. The pressure 
that the company feels from customers who complain about the increasing price of 
fair-trade cocoa products that occurs as a result of decreasing conventional market 
prices, has persuaded the management to reduce its margins for the sake of 
maintaining price stability. 
While fair-trade cocoa and chocolate is profitable, it is probably less profitable than 
conventional trading. The incremental costs of engaging in fair-trade cocoa and 
chocolate trading, particularly those associated with lack of scale, almost certainly 
outweigh the benefits. 
2.8 Motivations for becoming involved in fair-trade 
Given this conclusion about profitability, why do commercial companies become 
involved in cocoa and chocolate fair-trade? Several companies offer the motivation 
of making money, but they could probably make more money if they concentrated 
their resources on conventional business. A more convincing motivation is that fair-
trade principles closely coincide with individual company policies. For instance 
Dutch Cocoa•s policy clearly states the importance of maintaining the continuity of 
the business, its relations with other organisations, and the welfare of employees. 
Similarly, Chocolat Bernrain is a family owned business that follows philanthropic 
and environmentally sound principles. 
Another motivation for becoming involved in fair-trade may simply be that certain 
companies can. The capabilities of several participating companies mean that they 
are particularly suited to dealing with the peculiarities of the trade as it currently 
exists. In practice, this means that they are small, flexible and not answerable to 
external shareholders. 
Another common feature of such companies is that they possess individuals who are 
motivated to support good causes. Furthermore, company management allow their 
staff to follow these interests. 
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Part 3. Findings and Conclusions 
3 .1 Key findings 
• The Ecuadorian economy is currently a difficult environment in which to conduct 
business. 
• The Ecuadorian cocoa marketing system does not restrict competition. 
• Against this background, Maquita' s business performance has been impressive. 
The company has out-performed most of its conventional trade competitors. Its 
success is the result of high calibre management. 
• Maquita's cocoa operations are subsidised to a small extent. Donor grants have 
provided the organisation with capital to invest both in its marketing operations 
and in improving bean quality at the farm level. However, such financial 
assistance has only recently been available and played no part in the company's 
establishment. 
• Maquita trades on a preferential basis with approximately 15% of the smallholder 
farmers in the two provinces where it concentrates its activities. 
• Maquita runs a transparent marketing system that reduces transaction costs for 
both growers and traders. 
• Under its preferential buying programme, Maquita pays a price premium of 
between 8 and 15% over the standard buying price. 
• Maquita has provided training in cocoa cultivation, post-harvest issues and farm 
management to its target smallholder growers. The impact that this recently 
implemented programme has had on grower incomes has yet to be measured. 
• Fair-trade cocoa helped Maquita to establish itself. Since 1996, Maquita has sold 
only a very small part of its cocoa through fair-trade channels. 
• Although European companies that have become involved in fair-trade make 
profits from their fair-trade activities, they could probably make more money if 
they concentrated their resources on conventional trade. 
• Motivations among these European companies are varied. Good-will and the 
capacity to serve a niche market seem to play the greatest roles. 
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3.2 Conclusions 
• Maquita's impressive commercial performance has allowed it to deliver 
substantial financial benefits to its target smallholder cocoa producers. This has 
only been possible because Maquita' s management has excellent commercial 
skills. 
• Maquita's managers combine ethical awareness with business acumen. 
• A sustainable future for international fair-trade cocoa will only be secured if the 
market grows. The most likely source of growth is through supermarkets. 
Increased scale will improve profitability for the existing participants and will 
attract new companies to engage in the trade. 
• The lack of scale also limits the impact that fair-trade cocoa can have on grower's 
mcomes. 
• Cocoa is an appropriate commodity for ethical trade. It has been traded for many 
years, is consumed in large quantities, and has all the necessary infrastructure to 
support its trade. Furthermore, it is processed into luxury items that have few 
substitutes and have a high profile in consumer's minds. 
• However, with the current low level of fair-trade cocoa sales and in the absence of 
a recovery in international cocoa prices, one of the few paths to widespread 
increases in producer incomes is to improve marketing skills and efficiency within 
countries of origin. Maquita has achieved this in Ecuador. 
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Appendix 1 
Table Al. Ecuador's Demography 
POPULATION* 12,646,095 
Men 6,350,427 
Women 6,295,668 
Urban 8,098,436 
Rural 4,547,659 
Population density (per km 2) 50.3 
Rate of population increase 2.2% 
Life expectancy 64 
Rate of open unemployment 18.2% 
Rate of underemployment 54.3% 
Source: INEC, Proyecciones de Poblaci6n y Encuesta Urbana de Empleo 
(Population Projections and Urban Employment Survey) 
*Year 2000 projection 
Table A2. Ecuador's Cocoa E 
YEAR 199.6 1997 1998 
Metric Tons 69,904 41,148 12,766 
Thousand US$ 91,036 59,647 18,897 
Source: www.stca.gov.ec 
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Appendix 2 
Table A3. Costs, revenues and profits in the Maquita 
trading system (June 1999) 
PRODUCER INCOME 
Selling price 
PRODUCER COSTS 
Direct Farm costs 
Cleaning 
Harvesting 
Total farm costs 
Direct post harvest costs 
Fermenting 
Drying 
Delivery 
Total costs post harvesting 
Indirect costs 
Depreciation of farm equipment 
TOTAL FARM COSTS 
PRODUCER PROFIT 
STORAGE AGENT 
Purchase price 
Storage agent work: grading etc. 
Drying and packing in storeroom, 
Transpon from the storeroom to the canoe 
(mule) 
Canoe transport 
Loading onto truck 
Truck transport to Guayaquil 
Various, incidental expenses 
TOTAL costs storage agent 
SALE PRICE in Guayaquil 
PROFIT storage a.gent 
30 
US$ per Tonne 
800 
240 
45 
225 
15 
60 
7 
83 
7 
314 
486 
US$ per tonne 
800 
14 
3 
2 
6 
2 
10 
3 
840 
880 
40 
MAQUITA GUAYAQUIL 
Purchase price 
Drying 
Labour 
Gas for dryer 
Electricity 
Screening 
Labour 
Fumigation 
Chemical, two days 
Packaging 
Pita sack 
Loading 
Port paperwork 
SUBTOTAL ASE COCOA (sold through 
broker to USA) 
PLUS OTHER COSTS FOR ASS for Europe: 
Screening 
Extra labour for ASS 
T ransport 
Flat-bed truck for the port 
Loading the truck 
SUBTOTAL COCOA ASS 
GENERAL EXPENSES 
Rental expenses *** 
Communication expenses **** 
Other estimated administrative expenses ***** 
TOTAL ASE COCOA COST 
TOTAL ASS COCOA COST 
EXPORT PRICE PER TONNE 
ASE Cocoa 
ASS Cocoa 
GROSS PROFIT MCCH ASE 
GROSS PROFIT MCCH ASS 
US$ per tonne 
880 
3 
2 
3 
1 
15 
1 
10 
915 
3 
3 
16 
4 
2 
924 
102 
2 
0 
100 
1017 
1026 
1098 
1157 
80 
132 
*The FUE is the Formulario Unico de Exportaci6n (Single Export Form). The ASE variety is exported to the 
USA and the brokers take it from the MCCH yard, they don't have to deliver it to the port 
** The ASS variety is exported to Europe and has to be transported to the port and they have just included the 
costs when paying for the FUE 
The cost of customs paperwork -the FUE-, is 500,000 sucres, we have calculated this cost pro rata for 1,000 
quintals of export, thus the unit cost is 5,000 per quintal 
***The rental cost of the drying yard is US$ 1000 per month. The costs has been calculated pro rate for the 
number of quintals sold in June 1999- 11.500 quintals 
****The cost of sending documents: shipping note and others come to 35 dollars . 
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Appendix3 
Maquita's income statements for 1998 and Jan to May 1999. 
1998 Jan to May 
!999 
VARIABLE US$ US$* 
Sucre exchange rate 6,119 7,172 
SALES 
Public 28,438 125 
Organisations 
Foreign 1,429,041 2,360,500 
Related 
TOTAL SALES 1,457,479 2,360,625 
COST OF SALES 
Public 28,036 
Organisations 
Foreign 1,234,776 1,890,486 
Related 
TOTAL COST OF SALES 1,262,812 1,890,486 
GROSS PROFIT 194,667 470, 139 
CONTRIBUTION MARGIN 
BUSINESS EXPENSES 
Marketing· 100,163 179,486 
TOTAL BUSINESS EXPENSES 100, 163 179,486 
BUSINESS MARGIN 94,504 290,653 
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES 
Administration 34,557 11 ,644 
Finances 14,734 32,041 
Head Office 12,055 9,154 
TOTAL OPERATIONAL EXPENSES 61,346 52,839 
OPERATIONAL MARGIN 33,158 237,814 
OTHER INCOME 
Project Income 97,208 2,645 
Central Services Income 
Other Income 44,106 170,770 
OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Training expenses 
Project expenses 14,633 7 
Other expenses 106,823 103,127 
TOTAL OTHER INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 19,859 70,282 
NET MARGIN 53,016 308.096 
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Appendix 4 
Cocoa Criteria- Fair-trade Labelling Organizations International (Max 
Havelaar/TransF air IF air-trade/Riittvisemiirkt) 
November 1998 
1. Introduction 
The Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) members seek to change, 
with Fair Trade conditions for cocoa, the unfair international trading structures and 
improve the social and economic circumstances of small cocoa farmers in developing 
regions. In particular they aim to give their organisations direct access to the market at 
fair trading conditions, thus enabling them to operate independently of intermediary 
traders and providing them with tools enabling them to master their own 
developmental process. 
2. Criteria regu}ating the participation of cocoa producers organisations in the 
Fair Trade market under the Label of one of the FLO members. Producer 
organisations meeting the following criteria can apply for inscription in the FLO 
Cocoa Producers Register (FLO-CoR): 
2.1 the majority of the members of the organisation are small scale producers 
of cocoa. Small scale producers are understood to be those who are not 
structurally dependent on hired labour, managing their own fields mainly with 
their own and their families' labour-force, except in labour intensive peak 
seasons; 
2.2 the organisation is independent and democratically controlled by its 
members. The members of the organisation participate in the decision-making 
process which determines the general strategy of their organisation, including 
decisions related to the destiny of the additional resources available through 
advantageous Fair Trade conditions; 
2.3 Management and administration of the organisation are structured in a 
transparent way, members are informed regularly allowing them an effective 
control over activities and finances of the organisation; 
2.4 the organisation is based on the concept and practice of solidarity and 
mutual help; 
2.5 no form of political, racial, religious or sexual discrimination is practised; 
2.6the organisation is statutarily open to new members; 
2.7 the organisation is independent from any political party. 
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3. Sustainability 
The FLO-CoR and the producer organisations both engage to improve the basis for 
sustainable development in the production by giving room to: social development, 
creating better living conditions for the members, their families and the communities 
they live in; organisational development, encouraging and facilitating full 
participation of all members in the definition of policies and improving the 
managerial and administrative capacity of the actual and future leadership of the 
organisation; human participation, allowing women in particular to play an active role 
in developmental issues in general and specifically in decision making processes 
within the organisation; economic development, encouraging diversification of 
production in order to diminish dependency on one single product and the 
improvement of the quality of the product enabling the producers to realise their 
opportunities on Fair Trade and regular markets; agricultural practices which respect 
the specific ecosystems and contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of the 
natural resources, minimising and where possible eliminating the use of chemical 
inputs 
4. Product description 
Cocoa; commercially the term refers to the whole seed of the cocoa tree 
(Theobroma cocoa) which has been fermented and dried. 
5. Quality* 
Quality requirements and procedure for quality control have to be agreed upon in 
the buying contract according to normal trade practice. 
6. Pricing 
All Fair Trade cocoa prices are calculated on world market price quotation plus 
respective Fair Trade (FT) premiums. The price fixed for any transaction of Cocoa 
under "FLO-Intemational Conditions" can in no case be inferior to the following fixed 
. . . 
m1mmum pnces. 
6.1 Premium and Minimum price for Standard Fair Trade cocoa. The Fair 
Trade premium for all standard qualities is USD 150.--lton. 
The minimum price for FT standard quality cocoa inclusive premium 
isUSD 
1 '750.-- I MT FOB. 
If world market price rises above the basic price of 1 '600.-- USD the 
prices will be fixed as follows: World market price+ Fair Trade 
premium= Fair Trade price (for type of cocoa contracted)+ (USD 150) 
6.2 Premium and Minimum price for certified organic cocoa 
The additional minimum Fair Trade premium for certified organic 
cocoa, which 
is sold as such, is USD 200.--lton. 
The minimum price for FT organic cocoa inclusive premiums is USD 
1 '950.-- I MT FOB. 
34 
7. Payment 
If market price rises above USD 1 '600.-- the prices for organic cocoa 
and locally produced semifinished products are calculated using the 
price scheme for standard qualities ( 6.1) incl. the premium for organic 
quality (USD 200.--), and by applying the conversion factors 
mentioned under 6.3. 
6.3 Cocoa butter and -powder produced in the country of origin 
For the price calculation of locally (in the country of origin) 
produced semi-processed cocoa products the following 
conversion factors are used: 
Beans to butter: 2,4 
Beans to powder: 0,5 
Therefore minimum prices are for standard quality/organic 
quality: 
Cocoa butter USD 4'200/USD 4'680.--
Cocoa powder USD 875/USD 975.--
All prices mentioned under 6.1. to 6.3. are per metric ton (MT) 
FOB sea port of 
the producing country. Any additional handling/packing, 
packing materials and additional labour costs for retail packing 
have to be met separately. 
Unless other mutual agreement payment shall be net cash against a full set of 
documents on first presentation (FOB), minus eventual advance payments. 
8. Credit 
On request of the seller, the buyer shall make available up to 60% of the minimum 
value ofthe contract in credit facilities in favour of the seller upon the signing of the 
letter of intent, or at any date thereafter at the wishes of the seller, however at least six 
weeks prior to shipment. The corresponding interest charges shall be covered by the 
seller at current commercial interest 
rates (or better) in the country of destination. Reimbursement of the loan and the 
interest charges shall be according to the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon 
in the separate credit contract. 
9. Continuity 
Buyers and sellers intend to establish a long term and stable relationship in which the 
rights and interests of both are mutually respected. All purchasing should possibly 
cover a period not less than one crop-cycle with the intention to allow both sides a 
better planning and preparation of all business agreed upon. These long-term 
agreements should be confirmed by the exchange of binding letters of intent not later 
then three months before harvesting time. Annual renewals should be confirmed at 
least three months prior to the expiration ofthe previous Letter of Intent. 
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10. Arbitration 
In case of dispute, parties are held to inform the Fair Trade mark organisation of the 
buyer's country. If possible, the latter will work out a settlement proposal to be 
presented to both parties. If this settlement proposal is not acceptable to either of the 
parties, the dispute will be submitted to 
arbitration according to theCAL conditions, latest edition. 
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